Date: 2026-02-10 Tuesday
Time: 09:00 AM - 11:00 AM
Location: Price Gilbert Library 4222 (Dissertation Defense Room)

Zoom Link: https://gatech.zoom.us/j/91941139063

Committee Members:

Dr. Jeffrey Ding (Department of Political Science, George Washington University)

Dr. Jenny Jun (Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Tech)

Dr. Harry Oppenheimer (Jimmy and Rosalynn Carter School of Public Policy, Georgia Tech)

Dr. Rachel Whitlark (Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Tech)

Dr. Alasdair Young (Chair; Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Tech)

Title: The Dependent’s Dilemma: The Strategic Logic in Technological Interdependence

Abstract: Why do some states treat technological dependence as a political and security problem while others tolerate or even embrace it? Given that significant technologies generate disproportionate economic prosperity, strengthening state power in both economic and military terms, this dissertation outlines how technology relates to power at the national level in two broad manners. While technology operates as a power base and helps constitute structure, the early stage of technological development tends to produce asymmetry between states: a primacy state that innovates, uses, and exports the technology and dependent states that adopt and rely on foreign supply. Technology however can become a political instrument precisely because it can generate asymmetric interdependence. The leverage associated with technology is rooted in its contribution to power, yet it is often treated only indirectly in existing accounts, either as an economic relationship with possible political effects or as technological change with diffuse strategic consequences. By linking technology-as-power to technology-induced asymmetry, this dissertation advances systemic theory by integrating both relational and property concepts of technological power to explain a dependent state's threat perception. It begins with two core attributes of the primacy state from a dependent state's perspective: political motivation to exploit technological dependence and controllability over its access to the technology. When both are present, the dependent state faces a credible threat: the primacy state is both willing and able to impose disruption or conditionality. Under this configuration, the dependent state is expected to pursue a substitution strategy to replace its technological reliance. When both are absent, credible threat is negated; dependence is unlikely to be politicized, and the dependent state is expected to maintain the status quo. Another cases are the mixed configurations, in which only one component is present and thus threat assessment becomes indeterminate. If the primacy state exhibits political will but lacks controllability, the dependent state confronts a denial problem: how strong is the primacy state's desire to deny access, and how likely is it to invest in, or assemble, mechanisms that would make denial feasible? Conversely, if the primacy state possesses controllability but lacks political will, the dependent state confronts a commitment problem: how credible is the primacy state's implicit restraint, and how likely is this nonuse of leverage to persist as incentives and circumstances change? In both cases, the dependent state must decide whether the indeterminate configuration is likely to evolve into a credible threat.